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DIXON v. ANADARKO

DIXON V. ANADARKO PRODUCTION CO.:
Oklahoma Prima Facie Case of the Breach of an Implied Covenant in an Oil and Gas Lease Without Proving Profitability
When Lessee is Allegedly Draining his Lessor's Land.
In Dixon v. Anadarko ProductionCo.,' the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma added another factor to their determination of
whether the plaintiff-lessor had established a prima facie case
of breach of an impled covenant in an oil and gas lease. The
additional factor was that the defendant - lessee was allegedly
draining his lessor's land by a well drilled on adjacent land
also leased to the lessee.
In Dixon the lessors had requested cancellation of the
deeper horizons of an oil and gas lease for breach of the covenant to fully develop. The Oklahoma Supreme Court placed
the burden of excusing a five year and ten month delay in
drilling on a lessee who was allegedly draining his lessor's
land.2 The shift in burden of proof was founded on the assumption that a lessee draining his lessor's land should have superior knowledge of the probability of finding oil in paying
quantities and should also make studies to determine when
further drilling would be prudent.
Before discussing the factors considered by the courts in
determining whether the defndant - lessee had to excuse its
lack of drilling, or whether the plaintiff - lessor had to show
an expectation of profit from drilling, a review of the purposes underlying the implied covenants is required.
Oil and gas leases are generally silent concerning opera.;ons after oil or gas is found 3s This protects lessors from
1 505 P.2d 1394 (Okla. 1972).
2 Id. at 1395, the lessee, one year and two months after plaintiff demanded drilling of a deep test well, drilled an offset
well 660 feet east of plaintiff's land.
s 5 H. WnLTAms & C. MEYns, Om
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asking for too little and lessees from promising too much
since neither can anticipate the various technical and legal
difficulties which may later arise. To prevent confusion in
this void and to eliminate unenforceable vague contracts the
courts have recognized the implied covenants of oil and gas
leases. These covenants are oil and gas lease requirements
which fulfill the general contract principle that the contracting parties must show good faith and cooperate to fulfill the
purpose of the contract.4 These covenants allow the courts to
enforce the leases and the parties to expect fair dealing.
The jurisdictions vary in naming the implied covenants
but most have some form of these three:
1. The covenant to protect the leasehold from drainage.
2. The covenant to reasonably develop the leasehold.
3. The covenant to further explore. 6
If the lessee has breached one or more of the implied
covenants the lessor may sue for damages or cancellation of
the undeveloped unprotected, or unexplored portions of
the lease. Cancellation of the lease is the remedy in a majority of jurisdictions when damages are inadequate or impossible
to determine.7 In Oklahoma cancellation is conditional on the
lessee's failure to drill within a fixed period of time in all but
exceptional cases.8
To establish a breach of an implied covenant is similar to
any action founded on contract, the burden of proving the ele4 For

a discussion of the implied covenants' derivation from
the requirement that the parties to a contract must cooperate to achieve the purposes of the agreement, see Id.
§802.1.

5 See M. MEnm.I,

CovENANs ImPLIED IN Om Am GAS LEASES

§§222-23 (2d ed. 1940).
6 5 H. WLLiAms & C. MEns, supra note 3, at §815.
7 R. HEMNTGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AN GAS § §8.10-.11 (1971).
8 Gregg v. Harper-Turner Oil Co., 199 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1952).
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ments is on the party bringing the action.9 The plaintiff - lessor
must show that the defendant - lessee failed to exercise the
standard of performance necessary. In oil and gas leases this
standard of performance is that conduct expected of an operator of ordinary prudence, bearing in mind whether further
drilling or operation will be profitable to both the lessee and
the lessor. 10 The burden of proving that the lessee breached
an implied covenant requires that the lessor show the profitability of the further drilling or operation demanded by him. 1
Therefore to obtain cancellation for the breach of an implied
covenant the burden of proof is on the plaintiff - lessor to show
that a prudent operator would have drilled the well demanded.12
In Oklahoma the prudent operator rule has been modified
9 In addition to showing a breach by the defendant - lessee,
the plaintiff - lessor must show that a demand has been
made on the lessee to comply with the implied covenant
and such demand disregarded before a court of equity will
cancel a portion of the lease. Pohlemann v. Stephens Petroleum Co., 99 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Okla, 1951), aff'd, 197
F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1952) (concerning the covenant to develop); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Company v. McDaniel,
361 P.2d 683 (Okla. 1961) (concerning the covenant to protect from drainage).
10 Spiller v. Massey & Moore, 406 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1965). This
discussion of cancellation of the lease does not include the
issue raised by M. Merrill in 4 OxLA. L. REV. 58 (1951) that
if the lessor seeks only damages for the breach of the covenant to protect against drainage, the profitability of drilling is irrelevant to recovery.
1 Often the requirement of "substantial drainage" is used
with the breach of the protective covenant but this is merely an element of showing profitability. The burden is stated
as first showing that substantial drainage has occurred, and
second, that a protection well would recover the costs and
make a profit. 5 H. WnLIAms & C. MEYFs, supra note 3,
at §823, citing Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. McDaniel,
361 P.2d 683 (Okla. 1961).
12 Pohlemann v Stephens Petroleum Co., 197 F.2d 134 (Okla.
1951); Brewster v Lanyon Zinc. Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir.
1905); Spiller v. Massey & Moore, 406 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1965).
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to include an examination of several factors in addition to

profitability.1 3 In Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co. 14 the

Supreme Court of Oklahoma held than an unreasonable delay
in drilling would justify shifting the burden to the defendant lessee to excuse the delay.1 5 The Oklahoma supreme court in
following Doss has clearly indicated that factors other than
profitability of future drilling are important. In McKenna v.
Nichols, the Oklahoma supreme court stated, while . . . we

would consider the... likelihood of profit from further drilling, we would also give weight to other considerations...
(Emphasis added). 16
Oklahoma's modified prudent operator rule is similar to
the general prudent operator test supplemented with a consideration of other factors as unreasonable delay in drilling.
In Dixon the Supreme Court of Oklahoma considered another
factor, i.e. drainage by a lessee from adjacent land. Since
the defendant - lessee in Dixon had drilled a productive offset
well 660 feet east of the plaintiff - lessor's tract a duty was
imposed to "make studies and keep abreast of the available
information to determine when, or if, further drilling would
be profitable and prudent."1 7 Moreover, the drilling on adjacent land was held to have given the lessee "superior knowledge of the cost of drilling to the deeper sand and the probability... of finding production in paying quantities." 18 After
13 Blake v. Texas Co., 123 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Okla. 1954); Col-

pitt v. Tull, 204 Okla. 1289, 228 P.2d 1000 (1950); Doss Oil
Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P. 2d 934 (1943);
5 H. WLiLs & C. MYERs, supra note 3, at §806.3; Kuntz,
The Prudent Operator and Further Development, 9 OKLA.
L. REv. 255 (1956); Merrill, The Prudent Operatorand Further Development-Oklahoma Rule, 5 OxnA. L. REv. 453
(1952).
14 192 Okla. 359, 137 P. 2d 934 (1943).
15 Love, The Doss Oil Royalty Company Case and Subsequent
Decisions, 16 OimA. B.A.J. 1838 (1945); Merrill, supra note
13.
16 193 Okla. 526, 145 P. 2d 957, 960 (1944).
47 505 P. 2d at 1396 (Okla. 1972).
18 Id

-..
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recognizing a duty to make studies concerning profit and a
superior knowledge of the chances of profit the Court then
quoted an established rule of pleading which justified shifting the burden of proof:
It is the general rule that where the party who
has not the general burden of proof possesses positive
and complete knowledge concerning the existence of
facts which the party having the burden is called
upon to negative, or where for any reason the evidence to prove a fact is chiefly, if not entirely, within
his control, the burden rests on him to produce the
evidence. 19
Previous Oklahoma cases in which the lessee was allegedly, or in fact, draining his lessor's land have given no
significance to the common-lessee aspect. 20 Possibly it was
unnecessary to do so. In Spiller v. Massey & Moore,21 the
plaintiff - lessor's evidence was held to have sufficiently supported a claim of substantial drainage and that a prudent operator would have drilled. Likewise in Deep Rock Oil Corp.
v. Bilby, 22 the supreme court upheld plaintiff's damages for
the lessee's delay in completing a well to prevent drainage.
There was no issue of profitability in that the well was completed and productive.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Coal Oil & Gas Co. v.
Styron,2 upheld cancellation because the lessee held the lease
only to find a reservoir separate from the one which he was
already draining through adjacent land. The court stated
that the lessee's intent not to drill at anytime near was not
in accord with duties to develop but did not directly place a
special duty on the lessee who was draining his lessor's land.
However, the lessee's drainage was determinative in the
court's conclusion. Since the lessee was already draining the
19 Id.
20
21
22
23

5 H. WILnIAMS & C. MymEIs, supra note 3, at §824.
406 P. 2d 467 (Okla. 1965).
199 Okla. 430, 186 P. 2d 823 (1947).
303 P. 2d 965 (Okla. 1956).
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leased premises with wells on adjacent land his intent was
inferred as holding the tract for the possibility of finding a
separate reservoir and not to drill into the one he was presently draining. In Gregg v. Harper - Turner Oil Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, interpreting
Oklaohma law, held that a higher responsibility to develop
was due the lessor when the lessee was draining his own lessor's land. 24 The defendant- lessee had a producing well on
each forty acre tract of the 1,040 acre adjacent tract while
only one such well on 160 acres of the plaintiff -lessor's
tract.25 The court held that a special duty was owed the
lessor since the lessee would ultimately recover all the oil
under plaintiff's tract through its other wells. 20 Unlike Spiller

or Deep Rock Oil Corp., both Coal Oil & Gas Co. and HarperTurner Oil Co. at least indirectly considered the factor of
drainage by a common lessee from adjacent land. The last
two cases have been utilized to establish that:
[a] lessee who has leases on property adjacent to
that of the lessor ... [owes] a special duty of complete development to the lessor. . . and has been re-

quired to drill additional wells under penalty of
cancellation even though the lessor has
not shown
27
that such wells would be profitable.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has now held in Dixon
v. Anadarko ProductionCo. that a factor in the lessor's establishment of a prima facie case for cancellation of an oil and
gas lease, with the burden on the defendant - lessee to excuse
his failure to drill, is whether the lessee is draining his lessor's
land. Past cases as Doss and McKenna have considered a showing of unreasonable delay sufficient to shift the burden of
199 F. 2d 1 (1952).
Id. at 4.
26 For a discussion of the lessor's right to cancel oil and gas
leases for breach in absence of showing reasonable expectation of profit to lessee from further drilling when the lessee
operates on surrounding land see Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 792,
808 (1961).
27 Id. at 808.
24
25
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establishing profitability from the plaintiff -lessor. Dixon
couples the delay wth the draining of the lessor's land and
the imputed superior knowledge of profitability resulting
from that drainage to justify shifting the burden of proof.
This is a reasonable method of balancing the interests underlying the implied covenants. Both the lessor's concern for
reasonable development and protection from drainage and
the lessee's right to avoid the cost of undue exploration have
been respected. The result is a solution between either placing
strict liability on the lessee or ignoring the fact that the
lessee is the operator of the offending well.

CONCLUSION
Another factor has been considered for establishing breach
of the implied covenants to develop and protect from drainage,
i.e. whether the alleged drainage is due to the lessee operating
on adjacent land.
The court does not simply ask whether the plaintiff -lessor has shown a lack of prudence in the failure to drill. Rather
the court has examined factors in light of the essential purposes of the implied covenants allegedly breached for protection of the parties in a circumstance not specifically covered by
the lease. Whether there is a likelihood of profit to the lessee
if forced to drill as demanded by the lessor is, of course, one
factor, unreasonable delay in drilling another. 28 Now Dixon
has clearly added the factor of whether the lessee is draining
his lessor's land and thus unwilling to drill from the lessor's
land into a reservoir already reached by the lessee through
adjacent land.

28

Colpitt v. Tull, 204 Okla. 1289, 228 P. 2d 1000 (1950); Doss
Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934
(1943).
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